19 July, 2012

Might is Right

China moves to form govt on Paracels

BANGKOK - China took new steps to assert control over disputed areas of the South China Sea, pushing ahead with a plan to establish a city in the Paracel Islands over the objections of Vietnam.


The Hainan Province government in southern China agreed to set up a legislative body in the planned city of Sansha with 60 elected delegates, according to the state-run Xinhua news agency. The islands are known as Xisha in China and Hoang Sa in Vietnam.



In June, China's State Council approved the establishment of the prefecture-level city to administer the Paracel and Spratly Islands, parts of which are also occupied or claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. The Philippines has filed a diplomatic protest against the move.


The establishment of Sansha would have no bearing on China's sovereignty claims were they ever to go before an international tribunal, said Mr Clive Schofield, Director of Research at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security. AGENCIES


China: 你能把我什么样 ?

As China's star rises, so too does fear


The latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine carries an article on the inevitability of China becoming the next superpower, one of a mounting cascade of articles on America's decline and China's rise.



For many Chinese, it is high time for their country to regain its rightful place in the world, after a century and a half of humiliation, beginning with the Opium War of 1839-1842 and culminating with the invasion and occupation of much of China by Japan 100 years later.



As Martin Jacques explains in his bestselling “When China Rules the World:” “China had already begun to acquire its modern shape in the centuries leading up to the birth of Christ” and, a millennium ago, it was “the greatest maritime nation in the world.”

Chairman Mao Zedong used to enjoin: “Let the past serve the present, let foreign things serve China.”

Today, his successors are heeding his words. They selectively apply Marxism (a foreign import) to China's needs and have resurrected Confucius, whose descendants' corpses were dug up and desecrated during the Cultural Revolution.

President Hu Jintao has appropriated the Confucian concept of a harmonious society. But a harmonious society also has implications beyond China's borders. In theory, when virtue prevails in the world, then there will be a harmonious global society.

This is the ancient Chinese concept of Tianxia, or “all under heaven.” The emperor, who was the son of heaven, was by right the lawful ruler of all under heaven, which can be understood variously as all of China or even as the whole world.

Thus when, in 1793, King George III of England dispatched Lord McCartney to see the Qianlong emperor about establishing embassies in each other's countries to facilitate trade, the emperor saw this as a request from a tributary state.

Today, there is an attempt to revive this idea of Tianxia, with China of course in the center.

In May, Stanford University held a three-day workshop on the concept of Tianxia, which was defined as the Chinese vision of world order. The conference was sponsored in part by the Chinese government, through Stanford's Confucius Institute.

Stanford said the workshop was meant to examine China's new responsibility in the interstate world system.

This suggests that China sees an evolving world order with itself at the center. Other countries would offer respect and deference to Beijing while the Middle Kingdom would dispense largesse to countries that know their place and know how to behave.

Beijing is attempting to smooth its rise on the world stage by making use of traditional Chinese philosophical concepts, such as harmony and benevolence, to allay fears of an increasingly powerful China.

But in reality to what extent did Confucian theory affect the behavior of the Chinese government through the ages? 

This was the subject of a book published earlier this year by Columbia University Press called “Harmony and War,” written by Professor Yuan-kang Wang.

Professor Wang's conclusion was: “Confucian culture failed to constrain Chinese use of force. Instead, China was clearly a practitioner of realpolitik, behaving much like other great powers have throughout world history. Chinese decisions to use force were predicated on leaders' assessment of the relative strength between China and its adversary.”

Would China's neighbors be comfortable with a revival of the tributary system and treat China as their suzerain?

Perhaps they won't have a choice but, at present, every indication is that even the Confucian societies in Asia are resisting China's dominance.

Certainly Lee Kuan Yew, without doubt the world's most distinguished ethnic Chinese statesman, rejects this scenario. He has called on the United States to maintain its military presence in Asia to balance a rising China.

“The size of China makes it impossible for the rest of Asia, including Japan and India, to match it in weight and capacity,” he said. “So we need America to strike a balance.”

Referring to territorial disputes between China and small Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, Lee referred to the dispatch by China of patrol boats to the area. “Later, behind these small patrol craft will be a blue-water navy,” he said.

This is the current response in Southeast Asia to China's growing strength. If the United States should be unable to maintain its presence in Asia, the countries of the region may have little choice but to accommodate themselves to China's wishes.

Then, we may see in the 21st century the re-creation of a system of international relations that disappeared hundreds of years ago, and that never actually worked the way that it was meant to do in theory. - The China Post.


"... the United States has no interest in the specifics of the maritime territorial disputes and should refuse to be drawn into them. But neither can Washington permit Beijing to establish the principle that major powers can modify or nullify international law by fiat. Navigational freedoms are not China’s to grant or withhold. If it disengages from the region, letting China get its way, the United States will risk appearing to acquiesce in a dangerous precedent. It could forfeit its liberty of strategic manoeuvre along with its standing as guarantor of the global commons. ..." - James R. Holmes



If America were to continue with its outsourcing and tax break... in no time, it may have no choice but to give in. Most frightening nightmare of all ...

What happen then ?

19 July 2012







14 July, 2012

Nge Nge Lai (in hokkian)

Notification of Part of Open Blocks in Waters under Jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China Available for Foreign Cooperation in the Year of 2012

明目张胆
Is there still hope for peaceful development ?

Law ?
无法无天

14 July 2012

Hope

A New South China Sea Solution



As the South China Sea heats up as a geopolitical flash point, it’s worth considering an alternative view on how to resolve tensions in the region. Recent disagreement has placed nations in the area on a course for conflict, which could have obvious dire consequences.  But one alternative vision worth considering would take a quite different approach: building and operating a multilateral, pan-Asian energy infrastructure.
At its core, the dispute over national boundaries in the South China Sea is a struggle over offshore oil and gas. Coupled with fishing and transit rights, the sea is worth fighting over.
In the coming years, Asia (defined as China, Japan, South Korea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nation states, East Timor, Australia and Papua New Guinea) needs to invest trillions of dollars in new energy infrastructure, ranging from generation to transmission infrastructure, to exploration and production infrastructure.
Without this investment, Asia’s economies can’t grow. And without it, Asia’s living standards can’t improve, and the region’s greenhouse gas emissions can’t be brought under control as the global energy economy shifts from coal to natural gas to diversified renewables.
This means that Asia needs new energy infrastructure at the same time as territorial conflict looms over energy. Why not allow dispassionate markets to arbitrate resource claims? And how might this work?
The place to start is with what’s planned. Australia plans to invest nearly $200 billion bringing on line new natural gas supplies for shipment to China, Japan and South Korea as Liquid Natural Gas (LNG). Meanwhile, the ASEAN states are deepening interconnections between their natural gas pipeline networks and electricity grids under the Trans- ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) project and the Trans-ASEAN Electricity Grid (TAEG) project.
China, for its part, is leading the world in deployment of next-generation, high-capacity, long-distance Ultra-High Voltage Direct Current (UHVDC) power lines to upgrade existing HVDC technology. China’s also building out a national natural gas pipeline distribution network, with a possible use to import natural gas from Kazakhstan and Russia.
The telecommunications revolution, meanwhile, continues apace. A number of companies plan to lay new fiber optic cables across the South China Sea as Asia’s online communities grow. Indonesia is now laying subsea fiber optic cable across its entire eastern archipelago as far as West Papua and Timor. Indonesia would like to interconnect this network, known as Palapa Ring, to Australia.
It’s easy to see how a “network of networks” is taking shape. If these networks interconnect (the Internet is a template), the benefits will be huge: more liquid energy markets, more accurate (through aggregation) price signals for investment and lowered investment risk due to improved certainty of market access.
But the biggest benefit may come from reducing regional tensions. That’s because a multilateral infrastructure crossing Southeast Asia (either by land or by sea), could allow for the more efficient “hub and spoke” development of the South China Sea’s oil and gas fields.
One idea that could bear fruit would be to propose a bundled UHVDC power line, fiber optic and natural gas pipeline network stretching from Australia to China, Japan and South Korea. The potential of this network to produce radical transformation is real. In terms of sun and wind in Asia, Australia and China enjoy the region’s largest comparative advantage. Australia’s outback, for instance, could generate enough solar energy to power the world.
In China, harvested Mongolian winds could power China all by themselves. And that’s before taking into account offshore wind resources.
China and Australia, therefore, would be the “anchor tenants” of a pan- Asian energy infrastructure. Summertime Australian sun could satisfy northern China’s winter peak heating needs. Summertime Chinese wind could help meet South Korea, Japan’s and even ASEAN’s air conditioning demands.
With proper cross-border interconnections, a massive managerial and trading market could grow using the real-time communications enabled by the fiber optic cables included in the HVDC power lines. With a multilateral delivery infrastructure in place, development of the South China Sea’s oil and gas resources could be put out to tender, raising revenue to help build this infrastructure; ensuing development rights would go to those prepared to pay the most for them, and who are thus best equipped to efficiently exploit them. Markets would arbitrate prices.
This presents a welcome alternative to tests of nerve, for instance those seen recently between Chinese and Philippine ships at Scarborough Shoal.
An added benefit of a pan-Asian energy infrastructure is that it opens the way for a vast gas pipeline network to span the region. At present, long-distance trade in natural gas across sea frontiers has involved building expensive, single-generation, greenhouse gas-intensive Liquid Natural Gas infrastructure. Over the long-term, this may be wasteful. LNG isn’t a long-term technology. Pipelines are. Properly constructed pipelines can carry fuels other than natural gas. These include hydrogen, biofuels, waste carbon and even ammonia. Natural gas pipelines, in other words, provide “call options” on new technologies and energy carriers. LNG doesn’t.
Given all this, the logic for a pan-Asian energy infrastructure is strong. A ubiquitous, frictionless network would allow the markets to do the work of “picking winners” in the coming energy revolution. But it requires a massive change to orthodox thinking, and countries will need to think beyond national boundaries and work collectively. Climate change is a cross-border problem and this would be a cross-border solution. It’s surely worth thinking about.
14 July 2012

Peaceful Rise

Severe dent on ASEAN's credibility

The 10 members of ASEAN
PHNOM PENH - The Association of South-east Asian Nations' (ASEAN) failure to reach consensus and issue a joint communique at the end of its meetings in Cambodia this week - a first in the bloc's 45-year history - has put "a severe dent" on its credibility, said Singapore's Foreign Minister K Shanmugam.

The failure underscores deep divisions within the 10-member bloc amid conflicting territorial claims in the resource-rich South China Sea involving four of its members plus China and Taiwan.

Some members have traded blame on the failure while several officials have expressed disappointment with the outcome, which has cast doubt on plans to establish a regional economic community by 2015. 

"To put it bluntly, it is a severe dent on ASEAN's credibility. We talk about issues in the world in past communiques, but we are unable to deal with something that's happening right here in the neighbourhood and say something about it," said Mr Shanmugam.

"It is absolutely clear to all of us that we ought not to take any sides on any disputes. That is out of the question. 

"The question is whether we can come up with a consensus or form of reflecting a desire to move forward on these issues in a way that is win-win for everyone. … It is sad that we are not even able to agree on that. We talk about ASEAN centrality, ASEAN neutrality, ASEAN connectivity, ASEAN community in 2015, but before all of that, is the central issue of credibility."

The bloc's inability to agree on a communique is unprecedented, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said. "This is strange territory for me," he told reporters. "It's very, very disappointing that, at this 11th hour, ASEAN is not able to rally around a certain common language on the South China Sea. We've gone through so many problems in the past, but we've never failed to speak as one."

The ministerial summit broke down on Thursday. Participants had earlier agreed on key aspects of a draft maritime Code of Conduct but talks foundered after China insisted the ASEAN forum was not the appropriate place to discuss the matter. An emergency meeting called for early yesterday morning failed to break the deadlock.

ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan said the Philippines and Vietnam wanted the communique to include a reference to a recent standoff between China and the Philippines at a shoal in the South China Sea claimed by both countries.

The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement yesterday lambasting host Cambodia - a close ally of China - for "consistently opposing any mention of the Scarborough Shoal". 

Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong said his government does not support any side in the disputes, adding that the failure to issue a statement lies with all ASEAN members, not just Cambodia. "I have told my colleagues that the meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers is not a court, a place to give a verdict about the dispute," he said.

However, Mr Yang Razali Kassim, Senior Fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said: "Cambodia has to take responsibility for this debacle, which has crucial lessons for ASEAN unity going forward."

He added: "This failure to display a united ASEAN stand on strategic issues when under pressure reflects Cambodia's leanings towards China, which Phnom Penh seemed to favour, over solidarity with fellow ASEAN members over the territorial dispute. In so doing, Cambodia as the ASEAN chair shows its lack of experience and diplomatic skill as chair to preserve ASEAN solidarity."

Associate Professor Antonio Rappa, Head of Management and Security Studies at SIM University's School of Business, said that in the next few weeks, "it will be important for ASEAN to reassert its position" and "come together". 

The differences represent a learning experience for ASEAN, said Mr Surin, who added that the failure to issue a communique - which serves as a record of decisions at the summit - means that ASEAN will not be able to proceed on some of the action points it agreed to, such as a joint institute for peace and reconciliation to be located in Jakarta.

Mr Shanmugam also elaborated on the implications to Singapore. "I have previously remarked the international political environment is one where the rules are often unclear between big and small countries. We are a small country and, for us, the more rules of engagement and a structured framework within countries particularly in the region have to operate, the better it is for us. Otherwise, the smallest country on the totem pole would be left without rules." Agencies

14 July 2012

03 July, 2012

Nanyang is Home

Malay is still the national language of Singapore. 

We can learn. Proficiency is one thing. But of having the spirit of desiring to live peacefully in nanyang with the Malays and Indonesians is the utmost important.



Beautiful vocal

03 July 2012